We conclude that the adjourned prosecution agreement provides unequivocally that in the event of a breach of contract against Kaczmarski, the district attorney will only be able to resume Kaczmarski`s prosecution during the deferral period. The agreement clearly states that if Kaczmarski violates the agreement, “the district attorney may prosecute them during the period of the adjourned proceedings. (Added highlight.) As Kaczmarski asserts, reopening the proceedings after the expiry of the prosecution period is not an appeal under the agreement. The agreement provides for two possible remedies for the state in the event of an infringement: revocation/modification of the agreement or continuation of the offence, which is not allowed after the deferred prosecution period has expired. We conclude that the only reasonable construction of the deferred prosecution agreement is that the district attorney can only resume proceedings for breach of kaczmarski`s contract before the contract expires. 10 Both the State and Kaczmarski agree that the deferred criminal agreement is comparable to a treaty, and therefore we use contractual principles to determine the respective rights of the contracting parties. See State v. Roou, 2007 WI App 193, 25, 305 Wis.2d 164, 738 N.W.2d 173 (application of contract law principles as part of a fundamental agreement). The interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law subject to de novo review. State v. Toliver, 187 Wis.2d 346, 355, 523 N.W.2d 113 (Ct.App.1994). “If the terms of the contract are clear and unequivocal, we issue it in its current form.” Id. A contract is ambiguous only if it is “reasonable or sensitive enough to more than one construction.” “State v.
Windom, 169 Wis.2d 341, 349, 485 N.W.2d 832 (Ct.App.1992) (quote from Borchardt v. Wilk, 156 Wis.2d 420, 427, 456 N.W.2d 653 (Ct.App.1990)). It is up to us to decide whether a treaty is ambiguous. Id. We are not free to “revise an unequivocal treaty to free some” of all the adverse conditions “that it has accepted.” Id. (quote Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee – Co., 92 Wis.2d 17, 38, 284 N.W.2d 692 (Ct.App.1979)). We designed ambiguous language in a contract against the cartoonist. Walters v.
National Props., LLC, 2005 WI 87, 14, 282 Wis.2d 176, 699 N.W.2d 71. 18 In addition, the political argument of the state is made by the clear language of the status of the deferred criminal convention, Wis. Stat. P. 971.37 (1m) (b).6 As the prosecutor did here, Parliament clearly limits the time frame for reopening proceedings. Section 971.37 (2) states that “the written agreement [deferred prosecution] is terminated and the indictment may be resumed before the agreement deadline, after written notification from the person or district attorney to the other person. (Added highlight.) It is unreasonable to say that an individual agreement on open proceedings is contrary to public policy when Parliament has passed a law that itself accepts the provision of the disputed agreement. 16 The state`s clean-hands argument fails for at least two reasons.
